Sunday, July 12, 2009

Fed says Giving Money Back, Not Profitable

Why did the government give JP Morgan billions to rescue Bear Stearns? Because it was a bail out of the derivative riddled Morgan, dressed up in drag as a Bear Stearns rescue. Don't believe me, where is Bear Stearns today? See what I mean.

That page of the play book has been worn pretty thin, in fact the entire playbook is really thin for that matter. The elites are not so competent, but they do have the huge advantage of a weak competition in the US public from whom they feed. So Riddle me this Batman why does the government give bucks to banks to help people make their mortgage payments? You guessed it, it has nothing to do with helping people make their mortgage.

Well in a shocking moment of honesty that signals that they don't care anymore the Fed so much as said so.
Boston Fed senior economist Paul S. Willen, who is a co-author of the study, commented that the program would be better off giving the money directly to struggling borrowers to help them with their payments, as opposed to handing the cash to lenders where it sits in vaults and is only paid out in the firm of lavish bonuses to senior executives whose incompetence has never been exceeded in the history of the world.
Here is Mandelman on the Matter.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston released the results of its in-depth study on President Obama’s plan to solve the foreclosure crisis, and the conclusions shocked politicians and bureaucrats alike from coast to coast.

According to the study, lenders don’t modify the loans of borrowers at risk of foreclosure because to do so would likely mean having to reduce the amount of money the borrowers owe the bank, and therefore could potentially end up costing the bank money.

As a result of the study’s findings, it’s now considered possible by those inside the Beltway that the Obama administration’s only effort to solve the foreclosure crisis, which provides the lending industry $75 billion if they would simply agree to lose more money by modifying delinquent mortgages to more affordable levels from the homeowner’s perspective, is not likely to be nearly as effective as has been promised by the administration on literally dozens of occasions.

Boston Fed senior economist Paul S. Willen, who is a co-author of the study, commented that the program would be better off giving the money directly to struggling borrowers to help them with their payments, as opposed to handing the cash to lenders where it sits in vaults and is only paid out in the firm of lavish bonuses to senior executives whose incompetence has never been exceeded in the history of the world.
“Loan modification is not profitable for lenders,’’ Willen said. “If it were profitable, they would go out and hire staff.’’
Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, after considering the study’s implications carefully, said that the results may lead to unraveling the mystery about why so few struggling homeowners have been able to get help. “Let’s not jump to conclusions on this,” Congressional Representative Frank cautioned.

Frank is holding a hearing Thursday on his proposal to provide government loans to homeowners who have lost their jobs and can’t qualify for loan modifications and other help because they don’t have income. “We need to give more loans to people who don’t have income,” Frank said.

“The problem is worse than we thought,’’ Frank said. Honestly, we figured that this whole thing would be wrapped up in a bow by possibly Memorial Day, but for sure by July 4th. “The failure to do these modifications means the whole situation stays bad longer, so now we may need all the way to Labor Day to get the foreclosures under control. This is going to screw up my vacation plans… It’s very disappointing.”

The Fed’s study showed that only 3 percent of seriously delinquent borrowers - those more than 60 days behind - had their loans modified to lower monthly payments; about 5.5 percent received loan modifications that did not result in lower payments, which are sometimes referred to as payment increases.
The study looked at 665,410 mortgages, originated from 2005 to 2007 that had since become delinquent, and followed about 150,000 borrowers for six months after they received some sort of undefined help, through the end of 2008.

The study acknowledged that the lenders may have some compelling reasons to avoid looking for new borrowers to help, which would justify their compulsive lying about their willingness to do so.

As an example, the study established conclusively that up to 45 percent of borrowers who received some undefined kind of help on their mortgages ended up in delinquent again, and this phenomena appears to be even more common when the type of loan modification received by the borrower was of the payment increase variety. Conversely, about 30 percent of delinquent borrowers are able to fix their problems without help from their lenders, through such means as foreclosure, short sale, deed in lieu, and suicide.

As Mr. Willen phrased it: “A lot of people you give assistance to would default either way or won’t default either way. The banks are trying to maximize profits, and at this point in time maximizing profits cannot be achieved by the banks giving some of the money owed back by modifying loans.’’

Officials from The Hope Now Alliance, which is the private-sector alliance of banks, mortgage servicers and investors, were inexplicably unavailable for comment yesterday. “Maybe they were all on Jury Duty, one source said.

Similarly, officials at the U.S. Treasury chose not to comment on the Fed study, but did note in a statement that they would be continuing to lie about this issue, stating that more than 240,000 homeowners have received loan modifications this year under the president’s program. (This year? Wow. Now that’s impressive. I don’t believe it for a second, but it’s impressive that they are that willing to throw a number out there without vetting it.)

And to add insult to injury, the federal regulators said that the pace of loan modifications has been increasing steadily since last year. (I think I’ve mentioned this before, but I have had enough with sophisticated entities capable of tracking billions of bits of minute details issuing vague and meaningless statements. Now I want to hit the Treasury guys with sticks.)
IMPORTANT Additional Commentary by Martin Andelman…

The preceding story, in its entirety was TRUE. Except for maybe the part that Treasury said, those people lie all the time. To avoid sobbing uncontrollable as I was writing it, I added the lines intended to poke fun. In other words, I enhanced it here and there to emphasize the absurdity of it all, but this story is absolutely true and you can find it online easily by typing into Google something like “Boston Fed Loan modification study.” You’ll find that everyone has written about the study’s conclusion, from The New York Times to the Wall Street Journal, as if it was truly serious and important news.

It reminds me of a study that was conducted at Princeton, I believe, just a few years ago, that concluded that money does, in fact, buy some happiness. I remember being in my car when I heard the results of the study being reported and thinking: “Morons.”

Yet here we have a prominent economist co-authoring a serious study to be published by the Federal Reserve bank… and the media in its entirety is taking the “news” quite seriously, discussing it as if it has grave implications. And this is far from being the only example of this sort of thing that I could readily produce.
I believe what this should teach everybody in the industry is that “they” don’t know what’s going on, at least as related to loan modifications. They just do not know. I’ve been telling “them” for some time now, and they are doing their own studies as well. What this report shows is that we must keep telling “them,” something I’m committed to doing.

The other thing this should show you is the importance of industry data and the valuable role it would play, if we had more of it. For example, I represent about 20 loan modification firms in Southern California in my role as the director of the Commission on Homeowner Representation, or the Crisis Commission, as it is sometimes referred to, and although all of the data is not yet in, I would tell you that those firms alone may be responsible for 5% of the mortgages that Treasury claims to have modified since Obama’s plan started. And wouldn’t that make a headline that would stop quite a few people in their proverbial tracks?

Yes it would. Below is a link to one of my previous articles requesting data from all loan modification firms. Most firms ignored what I asked for, although I did receive data from maybe two-dozen of you. Apparently, the rest of you either believe that you are flying under some imaginary radar, or you don’t understand the importance of what I’m doing.

Just remember… I’m not in the loan modification business. I’m offering… volunteering my time and my column to try to help the industry. If I don’t receive the data, it will not be me who suffers as a result. If you’re concerned that by sending me your data you somehow place your firm at greater risk, I assure you the reverse is true.

Click the link below. Meanwhile, I’m going to step my efforts to teach the world to sing…

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